Populist parties in Europe attract many more votes than they did just a few 
decades ago and are now much more likely to govern. They have also become key 
players in the international sphere. At the same time, the relationship between 
democracy and populism is subject to substantial scholarly and public debate. 
This raises questions about opposition to this controversial set of political 
actors: do opponents favour the use of rights-restricting and 
exclusionary repertoires typical of 'militant democracy' responses to anti-
democratic or extremist parties? Or do opponents favour the ordinary, persuasive 
and sometimes inclusive strategies more typical of the daily conduct of liberal 
democratic politics? To what extent is opposition conceived of as democratic 
defence? How do strategies vary among countries and in relation to different 
types of populist parties? How do international and transnational actors respond?
Addressing these questions, the book presents new research mapping opposition 
to the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), Law and Justice in Poland, Alternative for 
Germany, League and Five Start Movement in Italy, Podemos and Vox in Spain, 
the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People's Party. It argues that opposition 
to populist parties in contemporary Europe is, in most cases, best conceived of as 
democratic defence as normal politics. That is, while there is no direct link 
between populism and a decline in democratic quality, critical claims justifying 
acts of opposition often problematise populist parties as threats to 
liberal democratic principles and values. At the same time, opponents are 
more likely to respond to populist parties using the repertoires of normal 
politics - or strategies typically employed against less controversial 
groupings - than the exceptional, rights-restricting instruments typically used 
against extremists. The case of Alternative for Germany, in which exceptional 
politics continues to guide much opposition, remains a case apart.